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Dur  ing the past de  cades there has been a
surge in the mon  e  tary pol  icy lit  er  a  ture. Many is  -
sues have been sub  ject to vivid de  bate, in  clud  ing
the  em pir i cal  ex trac tion  of  the  ef fects  of  mon e tary 
shocks, the op  ti  mal goals of mon  e  tary pol  icy, the
ap pro pri ate  mon e tary  pol icy  op er at ing  pro ce -
dures, the op  tion be  tween rules and dis  cre  tion,
the mon  e  tary trans  mis  sion chan  nels or the ap  pro  -
pri  ate way to model a monetary economy.
This note will not sur  vey all the lit  er  a  ture re  -
lated to these is  sues (an ex  cel  lent re  view of these
is  sues is Walsh (1998)). The fo  cus will be on the
anal y sis  of  what  mon e tary  pol icy  can  ac tu ally  do, 
on the eval  u  a  tion of the risks aris  ing from dis  cre  -
tion ary  mon e tary  pol i cies  and  on  sug ges tions  of
how these pol  i  cies can be im  proved upon to best
achieve their ob  jec  tive. In un  der  tak  ing this ex  er  -
cise we will re  view and build on some re  cent lit  -
er a ture  on  mon e tary  pol icy,  most  no ta bly  Wood -
ford (2003). Many of the is  sues un  der dis  cus  sion
in this note are sub  ject to crit  i  cism and have not
yet gained gen  eral con  sen  sus among the pro  fes  -
sion. We claim, none  the  less, that they are rep  re  -
sen  ta  tive of the current state of the investigation
on monetary policy issues.
The note is or  ga  nized as fol  lows. The next sec  -
tion ex  plores the ef  fects of mon  e  tary pol  icy, both
in the long and the short run. The sub  se  quent
sec  tions will only fo  cus on the short-run con  duct
of mon  e  tary pol  icy. Sec  tion 3 de  scribes what af  -
fects in  fla  tion in the short run. Sec  tions 4 and 5
de  scribe the char  ac  ter  is  tics, the risks and some
pos si ble  im prove ments  on  the  cur rent  mon e tary
pol  icy strat  egy fol  lowed by ma  jor central banks.
Section 6 concludes.
2. WHAT DOES MONETARY POLICY DO?
2.1.  In the long-run
The fact that a higher rate of money growth is
fully trans  mit  ted in the long run into a higher
rate of in  fla  tion has been rec  og  nized for cen  tu  -
ries. In the words of Hume (1752) “The ab  so  lute
quan  tity of the pre  cious met  als is a mat  ter of
great in  dif  fer  ence”. The root of this re  sult is clear: 
in the long-  run, the econ  omy is not sub  ject to any 
nom  i  nal fric  tion, thus changes in money will be
fully in  cor  po  rated in price changes. In the very
long-run, changes in money are sim  i  lar to
changes in the de  nom  i  na  tion of the numeraire,
which ob  vi  ously have no ef  fect but on prices.
Mon  e  tary pol  icy is there  fore neu  tral in the long
run,  i.e., it has no ef  fect on ac  tiv  ity or em  -
ployment in the long run.
This so-called quan  tity the  ory of money is one 
of  the  most  ro bust  re la tions  in  mac ro eco nom ics.
It  holds  for  dif fer ent  pe ri ods,  dif fer ent  mon e tary
ag  gre  gates and dif  fer  ent groups of coun  tries (for
an over  view, see McCandless and Weber (1995)
or Monnet and Weber (2001)). Chart 1, taken
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In re  cent de  cades, ma  jor cen  tral banks have fol  -
lowed pol  i  cies aimed at tar  get  ing a level for a very 
short-term in  ter  est rate. Does quan  tity the  ory con  -
tinue to ap  ply in this case? The an  swer is yes. To
see this it is im  por  tant to re  call the Fisher equa  tion 
(Fisher (1896)), which states that the nom  i  nal in  -
ter  est rate is equal to real in  ter  est rate plus the ex  -
pected rate of in  fla  tion(1). 
In the long run, the real in  ter  est rate will be a
func  tion of the time pref  er  ences of house  holds
and the rate of growth of the econ  omy. As  sum  ing
that these el  e  ments are con  stant in the long run, a
higher  nom i nal  in ter est  rate  will  be  as so ci ated
with a higher ex  pected (and re  al  ized) in  fla  tion.
This pos  i  tive re  la  tion in the long-run be  tween
nom  i  nal in  ter  est rates and in  fla  tion should be no
sur  prise. In fact, it is by now a styl  ized fact: coun  -
tries with high av  er  age nom  i  nal in  ter  est rates are
the  ones  ex pe ri enc ing  high  av er age  in fla tion;
coun tries  with  low  av er age  nom i nal  in ter est  rates
are also the ones experiencing low average
inflation.
How does this re  late to the long run mon  e  tary
growth in the econ  omy? To sup  port a higher
(lower) tar  geted av  er  age in  ter  est rate, the cen  tral
bank has to in  crease (de  crease) the in  fla  tion ex  -
pec  ta  tions of the eco  nomic agents, since it can  not
per  ma  nently change the real in  ter  est rate. To in  -
crease (de  crease) these ex  pec  ta  tions the cen  tral
bank has to per  ma  nently in  crease (de  crease) the
rate of mon  e  tary cre  ation. There  fore, in the long
run, there is a pos  i  tive re  la  tion be  tween money
growth, nominal interest rates and inflation.
In sum, mon  e  tary pol  icy is neu  tral in the long
run. In this time span, mon  e  tary pol  icy is able to
con  trol the av  er  age rate of in  fla  tion by tar  get  ing a
com  pat  i  ble rate of money growth (in case of
money-growth  tar get ing)  or  a  cor re spond ing  level 
of in  ter  est rates (in case of in  ter  est rate tar  get  ing).
The long run man  date of a cen  tral bank is thus
clear. Since mon  e  tary pol  icy can  not af  fect real
vari  ables, it should fo  cus on pro  mot  ing a low in  -
fla tion  en vi ron ment,  in  par tic u lar  given  that  high
in  fla  tion is costly. All the ma  jor central banks
share this focus on low inflation.
How  ever, in the short to me  dium run, there are 
nom  i  nal and real fric  tions in the econ  omy. In this
time span, mon  e  tary pol  icy has real ef  fects. Ac  -
cord  ingly, the cen  tral banks’ man  dates typ  i  cally
leave some room for short-run sta  bi  li  za  tion policy.
2.2. In the short to me  dium run
To eval  u  ate the per  for  mance of a given mon  e  -
tary pol  icy in the short run it is im  por  tant to un  -
der  stand first what mon  e  tary pol  icy can achieve
in this time-span. How  ever this is a very dif  fi  cult
ques tion.  Since  mon e tary  pol icy  ac tions  re flect,  in
part, pol  icy mak  ers’ re  sponses to non-mon  e  tary
de  vel  op  ments, the ef  fects on the econ  omy com  -
bine the ef  fects from the pol  icy shock and the ef  -
fects from the un  der  ly  ing shocks to which pol  icy
is re  act  ing. It is not pos  si  ble to iso  late the pol  icy
shock with  out an a pri  ori idea of the char  ac  ter  is  tics 
of those un  der  ly  ing shocks. These so-called iden  ti  -
fy  ing as  sump  tions, to  gether with data, al  low one
to an  swer the ques  tion of “what does mon  e  tary
pol  icy do in the short to me  dium run?”. Dif  fer  ent
iden ti fy ing  as sump tions  lead  to  dif fer ent  an swers
for the same data set. To be able to pur  sue the
anal  y  sis it is there  fore nec  es  sary to rely on some
be  liefs. Those be  liefs, com  ing mainly from cen  tral
bank un  der  stand  ing, can be sum  ma  rized by say  -
ing that “mon  e  tary pol  icy ac  tions can  not af  fect
cur rent  in fla tion  and  out put,  nor  in fla tion  and
out  put in the near fu  ture.” (Svens  son, 2000). Us  -
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(1) This equa  tion will ap  pear and be ex  plained in Sec  tion 5 be  low
which pres  ents a styl  ized mon  e  tary model.
Chart 1
CROSS-SECTION FOR A PANNEL OF 110
COUNTRIES IN THE PERIOD 1960-90
Source: McCandless, G. and W. Weber (1995).ing  these  iden ti fy ing  as sump tions,  the  data
mainly con  firms the re  main  ing be  liefs about the
ef  fects of mon  e  tary pol  icy. As re  ported in Chart 2,
for the US, and Chart 3, for Eu  rope, the iden  ti  fi  ca  -
tion of mon  e  tary shocks us  ing zero con  tem  po  ra  -
ne  ous ef  fects leads to the “rough bench  mark that
mon  e  tary pol  icy af  fects out  put in about one year
and in  fla  tion in about two years” (Svens  son,
2000). This is the sense in which mon  e  tary pol  icy
acts with lags in ag  gre  gate ac  tiv  ity and in  fla  tion.
These fig  ures also confirm that an unanticipated
increase in money supply leads to a temporary
reduction in interest rates. This is the so-called
liquidity effect.
These lagged ef  fects of mon  e  tary pol  icy on in  -
fla  tion and out  put, to  gether with the li  quid  ity ef  -
fect, cor  re  spond to the con  ven  tional wis  dom on
what mon  e  tary pol  icy does in the short to
medium run.
The im  pulse re  sponse of the iden  ti  fied mon  e  -
tary pol  icy shock also al  lows us to get some idea
on the mag  ni  tude of the ef  fects on in  fla  tion and
out  put. And the con  clu  sion is that these ef  fects are 
very small: a 60 ba  sis points de  cline of the in  ter  est
rate im  plies a max  i  mum im  pact on out  put of 0.2
per cent (af  ter one year) and on an  nu  al  ized in  fla  -
tion of 10 ba  sis points (af  ter two years)(2).  These
very small ef  fects of the mon  e  tary shock can also
be read from the ex  er  cises de  vel  oped by the Bank
of Eng  land. In its In fla tion  Re port, the Bank of Eng  -
land com  pares the pro  jec  tions of in  fla  tion and
out  put based on a con  stant in  ter  est rate sce  nario
with the pro  jec  tions based on an in  ter  est rate path
taken from mar  ket ex  pec  ta  tions. In its Feb  ru  ary
2001  is sue,  for  ex am ple,  mar ket  ex pec ta tions  im -
plied an over  all de  cline in in  ter  est rates of around
60 ba  sis points for the sub  se  quent 8 quar  ters. The
com  par  i  son of the end of pe  riod ef  fects of the two
in  ter  est rate paths al  lows us to con  clude that the
60 ba  sis points de  cline in the in  ter  est rate leads to
an increase of inflation of 10-20 basis points and to 
an increase of output of 0.1-0.2 per cent.
There  fore the con  ven  tional wis  dom on the
short to me  dium run ef  fects of mon  e  tary pol  icy
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(2) In the short-run, in  fla  tion ac  tu  ally de  creases af  ter a de  cline in
in  ter  est rates. This re  sponse is usu  ally called the “price puz  zle” 
in  the  lit er a ture.
Chart 2
EFFECTS OF A MONETARY POLICY SHOCK IN THE US (TAKEN FROM ALTIG ET EL. (2002))
Source: Altig et al. (2002)can be sum  ma  rized by a long lag on out  put, a
very long lag on in  fla  tion and very small ef  fects
on both variables.
3. WHAT AFFECTS INFLATION IN THE SHORT
RUN?
If one of the main fo  cus of mon  e  tary pol  icy is
the in  fla  tion rate it is im  por  tant to have some idea
on the de  ter  mi  nants of in  fla  tion. In the long-run it
should be clear that in  fla  tion is “al  ways and ev  -
ery where”  a  mon e tary  phe nom e non  (Fried man
(1992)). Dif  fer  ent rates of in  fla  tion in the long run
are  nec es sar ily  rooted  in  dif fer ent  ob jec tives  (im -
plicit or ex  plicit) of the monetary authority.
To un  der  stand the short run de  ter  mi  nants of
in  fla  tion one has to start by ana  lys  ing the ef  fects
on in  fla  tion of the most com  monly iden  ti  fied
shocks to the econ  omy. Start  ing with the mon  e  -
tary shock, it was al  ready de  scribed above that
while money and in  ter  est rates move con  tem  po  ra  -
ne  ously with the shock, in  fla  tion only starts to rise 
more than one and a half years later (see Chart 2).
This slug  gish  ness can arise, for ex  am  ple, due to ri  -
gid  i  ties in the price-set  ting mech  a  nism of firms,
due to fric  tions in the la  bour mar  ket, or due to a
learn  ing pro  cess by the agents con  cern  ing the
policy of the monetary authority.
When a non-mon  e  tary shock hits the econ  omy
the re  sponse of the rate of in  fla  tion is al  ways re  -
lated to the re  ac  tion of the mon  e  tary au  thor  ity to
the shock. It is not pos  si  ble to strip down the im  -
pulse re  sponse of in  fla  tion to a shock ir re spec tive
of the pol  icy re  sponse. None  the  less, it is still pos  -
si  ble to pres  ent some ideas that seem broadly con  -
sen  sual in the lit  er  a  ture. It is fair to say that the
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Chart 3
EFFECTS OF A MONETARY POLICY SHOCK IN THE EURO AREA 
Source: Peersman and Smets (2001))avail  able ev  i  dence sug  gests that the re  sponse of
in  fla  tion to most shocks com  monly iden  ti  fied in
the  lit er a ture(namely  tech nol ogy  shocks,  pref er -
ence shocks and real de  mand shocks) is sig nif i cant, 
mostly  con tem po ra ne ous and rel  a  tively short-lived.
Rep re sen ta tive  stud ies  that  con firm  this  re sult  are, 
for ex  am  ple, Iacovello (2000), Altig et al. (2002) or
Canova and Nicoló (2000). It would be dif  fi  cult to
ar  gue that it is the mon  e  tary pol  icy ac  tion which
is  pro duc ing  such  con tem po ra ne ous  ef fects.  We
can there  fore in  fer that it is the underlying rel  -
ation between the shock and inflation that causes
these patterns.
4.  THE CURRENT STRATEGY OF CENTRAL
BANKS
Cen tral  banks  in  the  ma jor  in dus tri al ized  coun -
tries share a com  mon un  der  stand  ing as to how to
con duct  mon e tary  pol icy  in  an  un cer tain  en vi ron -
ment. De  spite dif  fer  ences in the goals of mon  e  tary 
pol icy  and  in  the  spe cific  im ple men ta tion  pro ce -
dures, their mon  e  tary pol  icy strat  e  gies can be
summarized as follows:
a) The rec  og  ni  tion that in the long run the
mon e tary  au thor ity  can  only  be  re spon si ble
for  nom i nal  ag gre gates.  Since  high  in fla tion
is known to be costly, an ob  jec  tive of mon  e  -
tary pol  icy is al  ways a low in  fla  tion rate in
the medium term.
b) The  ac knowl edge ment  of  trans mis sion  lags
in the pol  icy. Pol  icy is there  fore con  ducted
with  a  for ward-look ing  per spec tive.  Past
and cur  rent vari  ables are im  por  tant as pre  -
dic  tors of fu  ture eco  nomic developments.
c) The con  trol of a short term in  ter  est rate in
the  im ple men ta tion  of  mon e tary  policy.
 d) The ab  sence of a me  chan  i  cal re  ac  tion of the
pol icy  in stru ment  to  spe cific  de vel op ments
in the economy.
In short, the in  stru  ment is an in  ter  est rate. Its
level de  pends on the fore  casts of fu  ture in  fla  tion.
There is no rule con  nect  ing the in  stru  ment and
the fore  casts. This means that the pol  icy uses the
in  ter  est rate as an in  stru  ment and is discretionary.
4.1. A model to as  sess mon  e  tary pol  icy
An  eval u a tion  of  mon e tary  pol icy  re quires  the
con  struc  tion of a struc  tural model where al  ter  na  -
tives of con  duct  ing mon  e  tary pol  icy can be com  -
pared. As clearly stated in Lucas (1980) “...we are
in  ter  ested in mod  els be  cause we be  lieve they may
help to un  der  stand mat  ters about which we are
cur  rently ig  no  rant”. The ba  sic model where to
con duct  this  mon e tary  ex per i ment  will  be  cho sen
tak  ing into ac  count that we should “sub  ject them
[mod  els] to shocks for which we are fairly cer  tain
how ac  tual econ  o  mies or parts of econ  o  mies
would re  act.” (Lucas (1980)) The choice of the
model would be more con  nected with its abil  ity to 
im  i  tate the econ  omy than with its re  al  ism. “A
”good" model (...) will not be ex  actly more “real”
than a poor one, but will pro  vide better im  i  ta  -
tions. Of course, what one means by a “better im  i  -
ta  tion” will de  pend on the par  tic  u  lar questions to
which one wishes answers." (Lucas (1980)).
There  fore to dis  cuss the con  duct of mon  e  tary
pol  icy we chose a very sim  ple model which rep  li  -
cates quite well what we called in Sec  tion 2 the
con  ven  tional wis  dom. Let us look se  quen  tially at
the  two  qual i ta tive  ef fects  of  mon e tary  pol icy:
first, the ex  is  tence of trans  mis  sion lags; sec  ond,
the re  ac  tion of out  put, lead  ing and peaking first
than inflation.
The ex  is  tence of trans  mis  sion lags is re  lated to
the so-called ag  gre  gate-de  mand block of the econ  -
omy. This block is sum  ma  rized in a be  hav  ioural
equa tion  that  re lates  pri vate  ex pen di tures  in  two
con sec u tive  pe ri ods,  and  is  there fore  for ward-
 look ing.(3) Eco  nomic agents that give up one unit
of real ex  pen  di  tures to  day save an amount of in  -
come equal to the price to  day, and the ap  pli  ca  tion
of that amount al  lows them to in  crease real ex  pen  -
di  tures to  mor  row by that amount times the in  ter  -
est rate di  vided by the price level to  mor  row.
There fore  eco nomic  agents  are  in dif fer ent  be -
tween  con sum ing  to day,  or  de lay ing  ex pen di tures 
when the change of util  ity due to the de  cline of
one unit of con  sump  tion to  day is iden  ti  cal to the
in crease  of  util ity  of  con sump tion  to mor row.  The
as sump tion  that  these  spend ing  de ci sions  are
made in ad  vance, or based on old in  for  ma  tion, is a 
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(3) Let us take the pe  riod du  ra  tion as a quar  ter. Then t and t+ 1
de  note re  spec  tively the cur  rent and next quar  ter.reduced form of real costs of “time to build”, or
“time to plan”.
The ag  gre  gate-de  mand block of the econ  omy
can be writ  ten as(4)
x E x E i r t t d t t d t t t
n
t = - - - + - + - + + 1 1 1 s p c ( ) (1)
In this equa  tion it rep  re  sents the pol  icy in  stru  -
ment, the in  ter  est rate, and r
t
n the nat  u  ral real in  -
ter  est rate. The out  put gap is rep  re  sented by xt,(5)
and the in  fla  tion rate by pt. The ct  rep re sents
mainly real sup  ply or de  mand shocks, for ex  am  -
ple pub  lic ex  pen  di  tures shocks, not fore  castable in 
pe riod  t d - .  The  op er a tor  Et d -   rep  re  sents the ex  -
pec ta tion,  given  the  in for ma tion  avail able  d pe  ri  -
ods in ad  vance. For given ex  pec  ta  tions of fu  ture
ex pen di tures  and  in fla tion,  an  in crease  of  the
forecastable nom  i  nal in  ter  est rate leads to a
decline in current expenditures.
As stated in Wood  ford (2003) “Banks re  strict
them  selves to in  ter  ven  tions that seek to con  trol
the over  night in  ter  est rate in an in  ter  bank mar  ket
for cen  tral bank bal  ances. But the cur  rent level of
over  night in  ter  est rate as such is of neg  li  gi  ble im  -
por tance  for  eco nomic  de ci sion-mak ing;  if  a
change in the over  night rate were thought as to
im  ply only a change in the cost of over  night bor  -
row  ing for that one night, then even a large
change (say, a full per  cent  age point in  crease)
would make lit  tle dif  fer  ence to any  one’s spend  ing
de  ci  sions. The ef  fec  tive  ness of changes in cen  tral-
  banks tar  gets for over  night rates in af  fect  ing
spend ing  de ci sions  (and  hence  ul ti mately  pric ing
and  em ploy ment  de ci sions)  is  wholly  de pend ent
upon the im  pact of such ac  tions upon the fi  nan  -
cial-mar  ket prices, such as lon  ger-term in  ter  est
rates, eq  uity prices and ex  change rates. These are
plau si bly  linked,  through  ar bi trage  re la tions,  to
the short-term in  ter  est rates most di  rectly af  fected
by cen  tral bank ac  tions; but it is the ex  pected fu  -
ture path of short term rates over com  ing months
and even years that should mat  ter for the de  ter  mi  -
na  tion of these other asset prices, rather than the
current level of short term rates by itself.”
To close the model we need to build the ag  gre  -
gate-sup  ply block of this econ  omy. In line with the 
re  cent lit  er  a  ture, this block takes the form of an
“ex pec ta tions-aug mented  Phillips-curve”.  The
most pop  u  lar story be  hind such a re  la  tion co  mes
from the hy  poth  e  sis that firms set prices in a stag  -
gered way. A dis  crete-time vari  ant of that model
was pro  posed by Calvo (1983). In that model ev  -
ery pe  riod only a frac  tion of firms choose prices
op  ti  mally. In Calvo’s orig  i  nal work this price
would be rigid be  tween ad  ja  cent price set  ting op  -
por tu ni ties.  These  op por tu ni ties  arise  ran domly.
In this frame  work, the price set  ting and in  fla  tion
are purely for  ward look  ing, and there  fore re  act to
ex  pected de  vel  op  ments of the out  put gap. This
char  ac  ter  is  tic is at odds with the ev  i  dence de  -
scribed above that the ef  fects on out  put lead the
ef  fects on in  fla  tion and that the in  fla  tion pro  cess is 
there fore  char ac ter ized  by  a  sub stan tial  de gree  of
in  er  tia. In the sim  ple Calvo story the ef  fect on in  -
fla  tion should pre  cede the ef  fect on out  put, when
this ef  fect on out  put is pre  dict  able. The model of
stag  gered pric  ing can be im  proved in this re  spect.
One first ex  ten  sion is the hy  poth  e  sis that prices
are set in ad  vance, that is, the firms com  mit to a
price for pe  riod t and af  ter  wards in pe  riod t d - . A 
sec  ond ex  ten  sion is to al  low for a back  ward look  -
ing be  hav  iour in the ag  gre  gate-sup  ply curve. This
is done by as  sum  ing that prices are au  to  mat  i  cally
changed in ac  cor  dance with some me  chan  i  cal rule 
be  tween the oc  ca  sions in which firms can choose
prices optimally. Firms that are not allowed to
choose prices optimally can re-set previously
chosen prices by last period’s inflation.
p gp k p gp t t t d t t d t t t E x ßE u = + + - + - - - + 1 1 ( ) (2)
This sec  ond equa  tion is the so-called Phillips
curve where g is the de  gree of in  dex  ation of the
firms that do not choose prices and ut is a mea  sure
of a cost-push shock. The in  fla  tion dy  nam  ics im  -
plied by this curve rep  li  cate the one dis  played by
the  data.  In  par tic u lar,  in fla tion  ex hib its  in er tia  and 
a hump-shaped re  sponse to a monetary shock.
In sum  mary, the main fric  tions of the model
come from some price stick  i  ness and some real ri  -
gid  ity. The price stick  i  ness is for  mal  ized as an ex  -
tended Calvo price set  ting mech  a  nism and the
real ri  gid  i  ties are sum  ma  rized by time to build or
time to plan constraints.
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(4)  See  Ap pen dix  for  the  der i va tion.
(5) The out  put gap is de  fined as the de  vi  a  tion of out  put from the
out  put that would char  ac  ter  ize an econ  omy with  out fric  tions.
This mea  sure is not re  lated to the usual def  i  ni  tion of out  put
gap (de  vi  a  tion from a trend).It is easy to un  der  stand the role of mon  e  tary
pol  icy in this model. The in  ter  est rate af  fects the
intertemporal choices, but can  not af  fect them con  -
tem po ra ne ously  since  ex pen di ture  de ci sions  are
taken  d pe  ri  ods in ad  vance. The chan  nel through
which mon  e  tary pol  icy af  fects the in  fla  tion rate is
the out  put gap. The out  put gap re  sponds to ex  -
pec  ta  tions of the in  ter  est rate and the in  fla  tion rate 
re  sponds to ex  pec  ta  tions of the out  put gap. This
model, for d³1, is con  sis  tent with the iden  ti  fy  ing
as sump tion  that  there  are  no  con tem po ra ne ous  ef -
fects of mon  e  tary pol  icy. A nat  u  ral value for d
would be the es  ti  mated time lag be  tween the
mon  e  tary shock and the out  put re  sponse. Most
empirical studies suggest that this lag is around
two quarters.
No  tice that the amount of money was not used
to de  ter  mine the equi  lib  rium paths of the out  put
gap and of the in  fla  tion rate. The equi  lib  rium of
the money mar  ket for a cer  tain tra  jec  tory of the in  -
ter est  rate  and  the  as so ci ated  tra jec to ries  of  prices
and out  put, will de  ter  mine the tra  jec  tory of the
mon  e  tary ag  gre  gate for which it is pos  si  ble to
define a stable demand.
 Note also that in the sim  pli  fied econ  omy rep  -
re  sented by the ag  gre  gate de  mand and sup  ply
and the money de  mand, a mon  e  tary pol  icy shock
leads to a li  quid  ity ef  fect in the im  pact pe  riod.
This oc  curs be  cause, for a given de  mand for real
money, the ex  is  tence of lags and the as  so  ci  ated
zero con  tem  po  ra  ne  ous ef  fects of a change of the
in  ter  est rate on out  put and prices, leads nat  u  rally
to a neg  a  tive re  la  tion be  tween the amount of
money and the interest rate.
The con  duct of mon  e  tary pol  icy takes usu  ally
into ac  count the iden  ti  fied trans  mis  sion lags. But
the main ques  tion is the one that we have been
try  ing to an  swer, that is: what are the foun  da  tions
of those lags? The re  ally im  por  tant re  sult from
this model, for the pur  pose of this note, is that the
ex  is  tence of lags in the trans  mis  sion of mon  e  tary
pol  icy does not come from the fact that the pol  icy
to day  di rectly  af fects  the  econ omy  to mor row,  but
rather from the fact that the pol  icy to  day is an in  -
di  ca  tor of the pol  icy to  mor  row. It is this fore  -
castable part of fu  ture pol  icy that af  fects the econ  -
omy to  mor  row. Mon  e  tary pol  icy has real ef  fects
through the an  tic  i  pated com  po  nent and these real
effects lead the effects on inflation.
This seems in con  trast with the com  mon un  -
der stand ing  that  the  ex is tence  of  trans mis sion  lags 
co  mes from the fact that it is to  day’s change in in  -
ter  est rates that per se af  fects out  put and in  fla  tion
in the fu  ture. It is also in con  trast with the idea
that  non-neu tral ity  of  mon e tary  pol icy  co mes  pre -
dom  i  nantly from sur  prises, that is from its non-
 anticipated  component.
4.2.  In de ter mi nacy
The con  duct of mon  e  tary pol  icy by most cen  -
tral banks, that ex  plic  itly or im  plic  itly can be char  -
ac  ter  ized as in  fla  tion targeters, is purely for  ward
look  ing. That is “only fac  tors that mat  ter for the
cen  tral bank’s fore  cast of the fu  ture evo  lu  tion of
its tar  get vari  ables, con  di  tional upon its cur  rent
and fu  ture pol  icy ac  tions, play any role on the de  -
ci  sion.” (Svens  son and Wood  ford (2002)). In prac  -
tice the cen  tral bank has to fore  cast the path of the 
con di tional  ex pec ta tions  of  in fla tion  that  them -
selves de  pend upon cur  rent pol  icy. This fore  cast
de pends  only  upon  in for ma tion  about  ex og e nous
dis  tur  bances and the pol  icy ac  tion. Then the in  ter  -
est rate is set as a func  tion of ex  og  e  nous dis  tur  -
bances. Al  though the op  tion for an in  ter  est rate is
mainly de  fended to avoid that fi  nan  cial vol  a  til  ity
is trans  mit  ted to equi  lib  rium prices and quan  ti  -
ties, it is well es  tab  lished in the lit  er  a  ture, as in the 
sem i nal  con tri bu tion  of  Sargent  and  Wallace
(1975), that in gen  eral this is not the case. When
the in  ter  est rate is set as a func  tion of ex  og  e  nous
dis tur bances  the  pol icy  leads  to  in de ter mi nacy.
Even if pol  icy is im  posed as an equi  lib  rium con  di  -
tion where the in  ter  est rate to  day de  pends on ex  -
pec  ta  tions of in  fla  tion in a ho  ri  zon of sev  eral
quar  ters, it is well known in the lit  er  a  ture that too
long a fore  cast pe  riod leads to in  de  ter  mi  nacy
(Levin  et al. (2001)) and that too strong a re  sponse
to fore  casts also leads to in  de  ter  mi  nacy(6)
(Bernanke and Wood  ford (1997)). As both things
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(6) Sup  pose mon  e  tary pol  icy is be  ing con  ducted to fight against
the im  pact on in  fla  tion of dif  fer  ent types of shocks. If these
shocks are se  ri  ally cor  re  lated, the more for  ward look  ing the
pol  icy the larger should be the re  sponse of the in  ter  est rate (see 
Gianonni and Wood  ford (2002)). To be ef  fec  tive, pol  icy is then
char  ac  ter  ized by large re  sponses to some  thing that is likely to
be es  ti  mated with considerable error.oc cur  in  the  con text  of  in fla tion- tar get ing  the
danger of indeterminacy could be significant.(7)
This in  de  ter  mi  nacy is mainly driven by the dif  -
fi  culty of such a pro  ce  dure to an  chor in  fla  tion ex  -
pec  ta  tions. As the mon  e  tary ag  gre  gate is not con  -
trolled any ex  pec  ta  tion could in prin  ci  ple be ac  -
com  mo  dated, that is, it could be self-ful  filled. As
can be eas  ily con  firmed in equa  tion (1) the same
in ter est  rate  can  be  as so ci ated  with  dif fer ent  in fla -
tion ex  pec  ta  tions which lead to dif  fer  ent out  put
gaps and, by equa  tion (2), to different realized
inflations.
When the in  ter  est rate pol  icy does not fol  low a
rule that guar  an  tees lo  cal de  ter  mi  nacy, as is the
case when mon  e  tary pol  icy does not re  act sys  tem  -
at  i  cally to any en  dog  e  nous vari  able, or when lo  cal 
de ter mi nacy  can  be  as so ci ated  with  global  in de -
ter mi nacy,(8) the ex  is  tence of “es  cape clauses” can
help de  ter  mi  na  tion of equi  lib  rium. Let us just re  -
fer two of those clauses. The first is the one re  -
ferred as an hy  brid rule in Svens  son and Wood  -
ford (2003). The pro  posed rule im  plies that the
cen  tral bank re  acts when pri  vate sec  tor ex  pec  ta  -
tions  de vi ate  sys tem at i cally  from  the  cen tral  bank
fore  casts. A strong re  ac  tion to those de  vi  a  tions
im plies  a  de ter mi na tion  of  equi lib rium.  A  sec ond
clause is the one de  vel  oped in Christiano and
Rostagno (2001). The in  ter  est rate pol  icy is com  -
ple  mented with a threat to change to a pol  icy that
con  trols the mon  e  tary ag  gre  gate in case the
growth rate of prices (or the growth rate of the
mon e tary  ag gre gate)  trans poses  a  cer tain  pre- an -
nounced  in ter val.  Wood ford  (2003)  de vel ops  a
sim  i  lar ar  gu  ment to claim that the threat to
change to a pol  icy that con  trols money sup  ply can 
avoid  de fla tion ary  tra jec to ries.  The  con trol  of  the
broad ag  gre  gate (the one for which a sta  ble re  la  -
tion with prices ex  ists) is a nec  es  sary con  di  tion for 
the cred  i  bil  ity of such a clause. How  ever, in the
cur rent  con text  of  fi nan cial  in no va tion,  it  is  not
clear how an institutional framework that would
allow the control of broad monetary aggregates
could be designed.
4.3.  Im pli ca tions
In sum  mary, re  sults in the re  cent lit  er  a  ture sug  -
gest that the pro  ce  dures fol  lowed by cen  tral banks 
that tar  get the in  fla  tion rate have the fol  low  ing
implications:
a) Be cause  the  in ter est  rate  af fects  in fla tion
through the forecastable in  ter  est rate path,
any change of the in  ter  est rate nec  es  sar  ily
im  plies a pe  riod where the sur  prise is com  -
pletely  in ef fec tive.  Since  the  sur prise  in ter est 
rate is as high as the sub  se  quent path, the
ini  tial vol  a  til  ity of the in  ter  est rate has costs
and no benefits.
b) Be  cause the in  ter  est rate is re  act  ing to fore  -
casts with an ho  ri  zon of sev  eral quar  ters in
the fu  ture, to be re  ally ef  fec  tive the in  ter  est
rate should re  act strongly to these fore  casts.
How ever,  the  lon ger  the  fore cast ing  ho ri zon, 
the more un  cer  tain are the tar  geted vari  -
ables and the more con  ser  va  tive should the
cen  tral bank act. The con  ser  va  tive moves
that we ob  serve in the data (and sub  se  quent
pat  terns to  wards the un  changed pol  icy) can
jus  tify the small ef  fects of mon  e  tary policy
that we initially described.
c) Be  cause the pro  ce  dure can be de  scribed as
an in  ter  est rate re  act  ing to shocks, the pol  icy 
leads to in  de  ter  mi  nacy and there  fore the de  -
scribed re  sponses of the en  dog  e  nous vari  -
ables are just one among a mul  ti  plic  ity of
possible outcomes.
In con  clu  sion, when the idea that mon  e  tary
pol  icy af  fects in  fla  tion with long lags leads to a
purely  for ward-look ing  pro ce dure,  mon e tary  pol -
icy is costly and has small and un  cer  tain effects.
These  char ac ter is tics  of  “in fla tion  tar get ing”
pro ce dures,  which  are  as so ci ated  with  de ci sion-
  mak  ing un  der dis  cre  tion are quite ro  bust to dif  fer  -
ent types of ri  gid  i  ties. Their draw  backs come from 
the fact that, as al  ready re  ferred, these pro  ce  dures
can not  af fect  in fla tion  ex pec ta tions  due  to  their
pure for  ward-look  ing char  ac  ter. Only if pol  icy re  -
acts to past shocks, can it bring about the de  sired
evo lu tion  of  pri vate  sec tor  ex pec ta tions.  The  rea -
son is that in this case agents, by ob  serv  ing shocks 
to  day, can in  fer pol  icy to  mor  row. If pol  icy does
not have this type of “his  tory de  pend  ence” op  ti  -
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(7) See Batini and Pearlman (2002) where these re  sults are ex  -
tended for a pol  icy rule that in  cludes a term on the lagged in  -
ter est  rate.
(8) See for ex  am  ple Benhabib et al. (2001).mal out  comes can  not be reached due to the for  -
ward- look ing  be hav iour  of  the  pri vate  sec tor.  In
the model de  scribed above money has real ef  fects
due to nom  i  nal price ri  gid  i  ties and to real fric  tions 
in the de  ci  sion pro  cess. How  ever the re  sults are
ro bust  to  an  econ omy  char ac ter ized  by  ri gid ity  in
nom  i  nal wages. It is well doc  u  mented in the lit  er  -
a  ture (Wood  ford (2003)) that al  low  ing for wage
stick  i  ness would not add power to the model in
rep  li  cat  ing the ef  fects of mon  e  tary shocks on in  fla  -
tion and out  put. Stick  i  ness of wages would cre  ate
a new way through which real shocks can shift the 
Phillips curve but this could be replicated in the
model proposed by a cost push shock.
5. IMPROVEMENTS IN THE CONDUCT 
OF MONETARY POLICY
Ac cord ing  to  the  re cent  de vel op ments  in  the
lit  er  a  ture if cen  tral banks com  mit  ted to a pol  icy
rule they would be able to achieve the op  ti  mal
(given the ob  jec  tive) equi  lib  rium. This is quite an
am  bi  tious pro  posal. The ex  is  tence of a com  mit  -
ment  tech nol ogy  is  some thing  ex og e nous  and
there  fore does not be  long to the set of al  ter  na  tives
that can be cho  sen by the cen  tral bank. A mod  est
pro  posal would be a type of “in  ter  me  di  ate com  -
mit  ment” which we be  lieve could any  way im  -
prove the way cen  tral banks usu  ally con  duct
mon  e  tary pol  icy. We can use the anal  y  sis of the
risks iden  ti  fied be  fore to pro  pose some im  prove  -
ments that build on the cur  rent char  ac  ter  is  tics of
the con  duct of mon  e  tary pol  icy by the ma  jor cen  -
tral banks. First, it is im  por  tant to rec  og  nize that
cur  rent pol  icy does not af  fect cur  rent in  fla  tion,
that is, that sur  prises in the in  ter  est rate have no
real ef  fects. This im  plies that even if the cen  tral
bank, when de  cid  ing pe  riod t’s pol  icy, has more
in  for  ma  tion than the one that was avail  able to the
pri  vate sec  tor when it took the de  ci  sions for pe  -
riod t, that ad  di  tional in  for  ma  tion should not be
used. There  fore both the cen  tral bank and the pri  -
vate sec  tor should have iden  ti  cal rel  e  vant in  for  -
ma  tion. This will avoid the costly and in  ef  fec  tive
vol  a  til  ity in the in  ter  est rate. Sec  ond, it is also im  -
por  tant to rec  og  nize that the pol  icy should aim at
in flu enc ing  the  forecastable  com po nents  of  in fla -
tion and that there  fore the ef  fi  cacy is through the
forecastable com  po  nent of the in  ter  est rate. This
im  plies that ef  fi  cacy could be im  proved if the in  -
ter  est rate were per  fectly fore  castable some pe  ri  -
ods in ad  vance. Ev  ery pe  riod t the cen  tral bank,
in  stead of fix  ing an in  ter  est rate for that pe  riod,
would an  nounce an in  ter  est rate for pe  riod t+d. If
we think that d equal to one or two quar  ters is a
rea son able  de ci sion  lag  then  the  in ter est  rate
should be de  cided for the next, or the fol  low  ing,
quar  ter. In de  cid  ing on the value of the in  ter  est
rate for pe  riod t the main forecast would be
period  t’s inflation.
The model pre  sented in sec  tion 4 con  sid  ered
the ex  is  tence of a sub-set of firms which up  dated
prices with the pre  vi  ous pe  riod’s in  fla  tion. The ex  -
is  tence of this in  dex  ation im  plies that the costs of
in  fla  tion come not only from the level of in  fla  tion
but also from changes of the in  fla  tion rate. This
lat  ter cost arises due to the in  creased rel  a  tive price 
dis  tor  tion caused by the in  crease in in  fla  tion vol  a  -
til  ity. Since a sub-set of firms in  dex prices by last
pe riod’s  in fla tion  while  the  re main ing  up date
prices op  ti  mally, sud  den changes in in  fla  tion have 
a cost in terms of re  source al  lo  ca  tion. The cen  tral
bank should thus try to mini  mise this ad  di  tional
cost of in  fla  tion, by avoid  ing a high vol  a  til  ity of
in  fla  tion. This im  plies that for a given in  fla  tion
fore  cast for pe  riod t the in  ter  est rate should
change less the higher the de  gree of in  dex  ation. In 
par  tic  u  lar, the in  ter  est rate set at pe  riod t d -  for
pe riod  t should re  act neg  a  tively to fore  casts of pe  -
riod t d +  in  fla  tion. For a given in  fla  tion fore  cast,
the change in interest rate would be smaller than
in the case without indexation.
If  the  mon e tary  au thor ity  com mit ted  to day  to
an  in ter est  rate  d pe  ri  ods from now, the gain
would be to avoid costly changes of the in  ter  est
rate with no ef  fects, and to have a smaller re  ac  tion 
to the in  fla  tion fore  casts. Al  though these re  sults
are quite ro  bust we can  not for  get that “the key
stum  bling block for pol  icy-for  ma  tion is lim  ited
knowl  edge of the way the macroeconomy works”
(McCallum (1997)). There  fore also from this point
of  view  the  char ac ter is tic  that  pol icy  in stru ment
re  acts less to ob  tain the same re  sult seems de  sir  -
able. Un  til now, the pro  ce  dure is de  scribed as a re  -
ac  tion of cen  tral bank fore  casts. There  fore no re  ac  -
tion was im  posed when re  al  ized in  fla  tion, or pri  -
vate  sec tor  ex pec ta tions,  de vi ate  in  a  sys tem atic
way from cen  tral banks fore  casts. As men  tioned
above, to en  sure de  ter  mi  nacy the cen  tral bank
should re  act to these de  vi  a  tions and there  fore
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to the de  vi  a  tions between these forecasts and
private sector forecasts (Svensson and Woodford
(2003)).
6. IN SUMMARY
We can sum  ma  rize the last sec  tions as fol  lows:
1. The rec  og  ni  tion of lags in the trans  mis  sion
of mon  e  tary pol  icy ac  tions to in  fla  tion has to 
be as  so  ci  ated with some type of lags of de  ci  -
sion of the pri  vate sec  tor. Given these lags,
the pri  vate sec  tor be  hav  iour has a strong
for  ward looking component.
2. The trans  mis  sion lags should be in  ter  preted
as the pri  vate sec  tor re  act  ing to the fore  -
castable be  hav  iour of the in  ter  est rate. Sur  -
prises have no ef  fects. A pure white noise
pol  icy would be com  pletely ineffective.
3. The con  duct of mon  e  tary pol  icy could be
im  proved if the cen  tral bank com  mits to an
in  ter  est rate in the next pe  riod (or two pe  ri  -
ods from now). The set  ting of the in  ter  est
rate for pe  riod t would have as main in  put
the fore  cast at t-d of in  fla  tion of pe  riod t.
Note that the ex  is  tence of lags in the trans  -
mis  sion does not im  ply a for  ward look  ing
pol  icy. This in  ter  est rate pol  icy could be
amended by a com  mit  ment to change the in  -
ter est  rate  when  pri vate  ex pec ta tions  deviate 
from central bank forecasts.
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Ar ti clesAppendix
DERIVATION OF THE AGGREGATE DEMAND EQUATION
 Here we will pres  ent the der  i  va  tion of the ag  -
gre gate  de mand  equa tion
( ) x E x E i r t t d t t d t t t
n
t = - - - + - + - + + 1 1 1 s p c
Let us be  gin by as  sum  ing d=0. To de  rive this
equa  tion we take the first or  der con  di  tion of the
house  hold prob  lem in or  der to pres  ent and fu  ture
con sump tion  given  by(9)
( ) ( )
( )
U C ß i E
U C




















where  xt rep  re  sents shocks to pref  er  ences. When
we rep  re  sent this Eu  ler equa  tion as a func  tion of
out  put in  stead of con  sump  tion we have
( )
( )
U Y ß i E
U Y





















where  zt con  tains now not only shocks to pref  er  -
ences but real de  mand com  po  nents dif  fer  ent from
pri vate  con sump tion.  Let ting  gov ern ment  pur -
chases be de  noted by Gt mar  ket clear  ing im  plies
that  C G Y t t t + = . Loglinearizing equa  tion (3)
around a de  ter  min  is  tic steady-state, and rep  re  -
sent ing  by  $ G the percentual de  vi  a  tion from the
steady state of  G, we can write
[ ] [ ] $ $ $ $ $ $ Y g E Y g i t t t t t t t = + - - - + + + 1 1 1 s p
where s rep  re  sents the intertemporal elas  tic  ity of
sub sti tu tion.
 If we de  fine the out  put gap as x Y Y t t t
n = - $ $
with $ Yt
n be  ing the de  vi  a  tion of the flex  i  ble price
equi  lib  rium out  put from the steady state, we can
write the above equa  tion as




t t = + - - + - - + + + + 1 1 1 1 s p








+ + º - - + 1
1
1 1 s $ $ $ $  we
ob  tain equa  tion (1), with d=0. The ex  is  tence of de  -
ci  sion de  lays im  plies that the de  ci  sions for pe  riod
t are taken in pe  riod t-d. In this case the house  -
hold’s first or  der con  di  tion should be written as
( )
( )
E U C ßE i
U C




















Us  ing the same se  quence as be  fore we ar  rive at 
equa  tion (1) where ct t t
n
t d t t
n g Y E g Y = - - - - ($ $ ) ($ $ ).
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(9) This con  di  tion is a sim  pli  fi  ca  tion since it as  sumes that the econ  -
omy is cashless and that la  bour is in  elas  tic or that pref  er  ences
are  additively  sep a ra ble  be tween  con sump tion  and  leisure.